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Abstract 
 
The ‘social investment market’ (SIM) in the UK is a growth area due to the governments’ focus upon 
building up the supply-side element of the market over the last decade, often through the direct 
financing of ‘social and investment finance intermediaries’ (SIFIs). However, this ignores problems 
that can occur on the demand-side of the SIM, such as a lack of ‘investment readiness’ (IR) amongst 
social enterprises (SEs) seeking investment. Indeed, whilst there is now a significant body of policy-
based and practitioner research exploring the SIM, there remains a paucity of empirical academic 
research. The research reported in this paper sought to explore SIFI perceptions of what constituted 
IR in the SIM. Semi-structured interviews were held with the fund managers (or relevant personnel) at 
15 SIFIs in order to explore what they believed constituted IR and how they assessed this. The results 
indicate that the conception of IR in the SIM is similar to that held in mainstream financial markets. 
The results are discussed in relation to the prior literature and theories of the SIM. 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Social Investment’, sometimes also called ‘Impact Investment’, ultimately seeks to provide finance to 
social ventures (either debt or equity finance) with an expectation that a social as well as financial 
return will be generated (Brown and Norman, 2011). In the UK the ‘social investment market’ (SIM) 
was estimated to have made a total of £165 million of social investments in 2011 (Brown and Norman, 
2011) and this is predicted to grow to around £1 billion in the UK by 2015 (Brown and Swersky, 
2012). Indeed, the UK is positively placed to play a leading role in this global growth, due to its depth 
of social-purpose organisations, its strong financial sector (Evenett and Richter, 2011) and the strong 
political support for the SIM that has come from successive UK governments (Nicholls, 2010b). 
Accessing external funding or support through investment contracts or alliances can be beneficial to 
social enterprises (SEs) as it builds organisational independence and resilience (Sakarya et al., 2012). 
However, these changes to the SE’s core model of mission delivery provide challenges to management 
teams (Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011) that often require restructuring or skill-set injections at board 
level. An inability to successfully undertake these changes often causes problems for SEs seeking 
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finance from the SIM, as they do not have robust governance structures, skilled management teams 
and detailed business plans in place (Hines, 2005; Hill, 2011; Howard, 2012). This inability to access 
finance has led to SEs being encouraged to adopt private sector business practices in order to access 
social investment from ‘Social and Investment Finance Intermediaries’ (SIFIs) (Nicholls and Paton, 
2009). This perception that social enterprises are not ‘investment ready’ has been driven by a duality in 
the SIM, in which SEs cannot access social investment and social investors cannot find ‘investment 
ready’ propositions (Howard, 2012). There is a current paucity of academic research into social 
finance and the SIM in general and researchers have identified a need for more theoretical and 
empirical studies so that a more detailed understanding of the SIM can be developed (Battle-Anderson 
and Dees, 2006; Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls and Paton, 2009; Nicholls, 2010a; Moore et al., 2012). 
Specifically and in relation to this study, there is no academic research that explores in detail what 
SIFIs define as ‘investment readiness’ (IR) and the research that does exist around the investment 
criteria of social investors is methodologically constrained and focuses too broadly on social investors. 
Indeed, a clearer understanding of the investment criteria adopted by SIFIs would allow SEs (and SE 
support organisations) to more easily access capital in the SIM. This paper reports research that 
explored SIFI perceptions of IR through in-depth semi-structured interviews.  
 
Analytical Framework 
 
Social Finance & the Structure of the Social Investment Market 
 
SF and the description of the SIM adhered to in this article is distinct from ‘Socially Responsible 
Investment’ (SRI) and ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR). Unlike SRI, SF requires more than the 
negative/positive screening practices adopted in commercial investments that focus on social, 
environmental and governance criteria relative to the investee. In relation to CSR, social investment 
organisations have social impact at the core of their mission, as opposed to as an appendage to it 
(Geobey et al., 2012; Evenett and Richter, 2011). SF can be defined as being any ‘flows of capital that 
start-up, sustain, or grow individual, group, organizational or sectoral action aimed primarily at 
generating social or environmental value, often in the form of public goods or positive externalities’ 
(Nicholls and Paton, 2009: 3). SF includes a broad range of investment approaches including ‘impact 
investing’, government finance (i.e. Social Impact Bonds) and philanthropic investment through 
foundations (i.e. venture philanthropy) (Moore, Wesley and Brodhead, 2012). The organic 
development of the SIM and the organisations operating in this market has led to a diverse and 
heterogeneous range of views on the future macro-development of the SIM and of the financial tools 
and models that are operated at a micro-level (Howard, 2012). 
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Nicholls (2010a) identifies three elements that constitute the structure of the market; supply, demand 
and intermediation. In the UK the supply-side investors have predominantly been charitable 
endowment funds, social banks and the UK government itself (Nicholls, 2010a). These supply-side 
investors seek what Emerson (2003) terms ‘blended returns on investment’, that is the delivery of both 
financial returns and social/environmental impacts from their investments. Nicholls and Murdock 
(2011) identified ‘demand-side’ organisations as being social enterprises, charities, cooperatives, 
social businesses and public/private hybrid organisations. These organisations all operate according to 
a ‘double or triple bottom-line’, in which a social/environmental mission has to be balanced alongside 
financial sustainability (Campi et al., 2006). These demand-side organisations seek investment capital 
either to start-up, grow or sustain their social activity. The social finance market is typical of many 
nascent markets in that it is made up of a small number of organisations that deliver a heterogeneous 
range of support, finance options and investment vehicles (Nicholls, 2010a). These organisations 
operate primarily in the intermediary market, in which SIFIs link social entrepreneurs with investors 
seeking a social impact (Evenett and Richter, 2011). The focus of the research reported in this paper 
was upon this intermediation element of the SIM. 
 
A SIFI can be defined as any organisation with or without funds that seeks to match social investors 
with investees and these include social venture capital, social banks, brokers, advisors and some 
charitable foundations (ClearlySo, 2011). Brown and Norman (2011) identified 30 SIFI organisations 
operating in the UK at a local, regional or national level, of which six SIFIs accounted for 90% of 
investment. SIFIs provide a mixture of debt (loans), quasi-equity (equity blended with debt-based 
repayments) and equity finance. Generally, SIFIs target higher financial returns for riskier investments 
(i.e. equity) and lower returns for less risky investments (i.e. secured loans). However, in addition to 
SIFIs offering such funding there are also venture philanthropy (VP) funds and social enterprise 
development organisations/brokerages (SEDs). VP replaces the hands-off approach utilised by 
individuals/foundations giving charitable donations, to a more deeply engaged approach in which the 
grant provided is secured on a contractual basis that is tied to preferred outcomes set by the 
philanthropic institution/individual (John, 2006). SEDs also provide consultancy support to SEs (as 
well as supply-side investors) in the areas of law, accounting, marketing and business development 
(Nicholls, 2010a).  
 
The Barriers to the Future Development of the UK Social Investment Market 
 
Nicholls (2010a) identifies three possible future scenarios for the SIM. The first posits that the SIM 
will move into the mainstream financial markets and be absorbed by them as the needs of the investor 
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are given priority. The second states that the status quo will persist and that the SIM will remain on the 
margins of the mainstream investment sector, with investor needs and the ‘logic of gift giving’ 
achieving a tensional balance (Nicholls, 2010a). The third theorises that the SIM will act as a 
transformative agent and that the idea of ‘blended-value’ would be exported over time to the 
mainstream finance sector, which would in-turn drive systemic change that would see social and 
environmental return calculations built into all investments due to the primacy of a values-driven 
rationality. Nicholls (2010a: 90) states that at the present time it appears as if it is the first scenario that 
‘is moving towards dominance’, which can be evidenced through the large numbers of actors from the 
mainstream finance sector that are playing a leading role in shaping the development of the SIM. 
 
There are a number of factors within the UK SIM that are acting as barriers to growth. These include a 
lack of risk-assessment and social impact metrics, which leads to a ‘fragmentary landscape’ in which 
information flow is limited and inappropriate financial instruments are imported from the mainstream 
market (Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls, 2010b; Wood et al., 2012). This lack of information leads to 
extended due-diligence processes, put in place by risk-averse organisations that increase transaction 
costs (Evenett and Richter, 2011), and these costs are exacerbated by the high number of investor 
sources that SIFIs have to utilise compared with an equivalent, mainstream fund (O’Donohoe et al., 
2010). These high transaction costs leave less recyclable capital and also may mean that riskier 
propositions are priced out of the investment market (Geobey et al., 2012). The difficulties inherent in 
trying to measure social impact (SI) have also led to a lack of information in the SIM, a factor that is 
complicated by the existence of a plethora of methodologies for measuring SI. Three prominent SI 
methodologies have arisen in the SIM; namely ‘Social Return on Investment’ (SROI) (Maree and 
Mertens, 2012); the ‘Impact Reporting and Investment Standards’ (IRIS); and its derivative the 
‘Global Impact Investing Rating System’ (GIIRS) (Saltuk et al., 2011). However, the use of SROI has 
been limited as the monetisation of complex social problems is seen as limited in its effectiveness 
(Maree and Mertens, 2012); whilst research by Saltuk et al. (2011) highlighted that only 20.15% of 
social investors utilised IRIS or GIIRS.  
 
Another barrier to growth for the SIM has been the perceived lack of demand-side organisations that 
are IR and the perception of SEs as high-risk investments (Strandberg, 2007). This was further 
emphasised in more recent research by Howard (2012) that identified a demand/supply gap in the SIM 
between supply-side investors and demand-side investees. A lack of IR amongst demand-side 
investees is a factor that will limit the growth of the SIM and that will potentially stifle riskier (but 
more innovative) early-stage financing. Research that therefore understands what SIFIs define as IR 
will provide SEs and their support organisations with important information that they can use to 
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develop their organisations in order to access finance from the SIM. Research into investment criteria 
in the SIM has been carried out, with McWade (2012) identifying five areas of social investor (supply-
side) focus. These were (1) the social mission and its centrality to the overall business aims; (2) a solid 
and concise business plan; (3) a skilled and credible management team/board; (4) the company’s 
financial viability and (5) a clearly defined exit plan. Indeed, McWade (2012) identified that whilst the 
social mission is important to social investors, this criterion supplements rather than replaces the 
financial due-diligence that occurs in the mainstream investment market. However, McWade’s (2012) 
analysis was carried out amongst social investors as a whole (high net-worth individuals, institutional 
investors and consumer depositors) and did not specifically focus upon SIFIs or the intermediary 
element of the market. This is an important distinction as not only is the SIM in the UK heavily reliant 
on these intermediaries (Evenett and Richter, 2011), but the pool of social investors that invest in the 
SIM is extremely heterogeneous. In addition, the participant recruitment and data analysis 
methodologies utilised by McWade (2012) are unspecified and so the validity of the results is difficult 
to determine. There therefore remains a need for the evaluation of IR within the intermediary element 
of the SIM that is rigorous and valid in both its recruitment of participants and the analysis of the 
interview data. However, the lack of academic research on the SIM first requires an examination of the   
mainstream finance literature around IR in order to develop a clear conceptual understanding. 
 
Investment Readiness 
 
Government interventions aimed at increasing ‘small and medium-sized enterprise’s’ (SMEs) access to 
finance are usually targeted at increasing the availability of supply-side capital (Mason and Kwok, 
2010). In the UK there has been a focus upon developing the supply-side of the SIM, as the 
government has sought to create a market and regulatory framework for SF through legislation and 
direct/indirect funding (Nicholls, 2010b). This has resulted in the neglect of problems on the demand-
side of the SIM (such as a lack of IR amongst SEs), although this focus is now shifting through such 
schemes as the ‘Investment and Contract Readiness Fund’ (ICRF) (SIB, 2013). Gregory et al. (2012: 
6) define IR as “…an investee being perceived to possess the attributes, which makes them an 
investible proposition by an appropriate investor for the finance they are seeking.” The process of 
seeking investment and becoming IR begins at the point that the entrepreneur/enterprise realise that 
their personal resources, or those of their organisation, are insufficient for their start-up, growth or 
sustainability needs (Silver et al., 2010).  
 
Prior research identifies the quality of a potential investee’s business plan as being crucial to the IR of 
an SME (Howard, 2012), with investors often being frustrated by the poor quality of the business 
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proposals submitted for funding (Mason and Harrison, 1999; Paul et al., 2003). The viability of a 
business proposal involves an examination of the capitalisation of the business, the management team 
in place, return versus risk analysis and the quality of information held and provided by the business 
(Mason and Harrison, 2001; Mason and Kwok, 2010). In a study of debt and equity investors, Mason 
and Stark (2004) identified that debt financiers (bankers) placed more emphasis on financial data than 
did equity financiers (VCs and business angels). This is possibly due to the lower margins on debt-
finance investments, which force bankers to minimise ‘Type One Errors’ (lending to businesses that 
subsequently fail), as well as a debt-financiers’ reduced ability to monitor an investment in the same 
detail that an equity investor could (Mason and Stark, 2004). Research has also shown that there are 
also high rejection rates of business proposals by equity investors, usually directly related to poor 
business proposals that do not meet investment criteria (Mason and Kwok, 2010). Despite this, there 
are also numerous rejections of good business propositions that are otherwise IR. This is because in 
markets where imperfect information exists, investors need to balance risk and this leads to 
‘investment ready’ businesses being declined capital (Deakins et al., 2008). 
 
The characteristics and skill-sets of the entrepreneur and their management teams have also been 
shown in prior research to be extremely important in accessing finance and being considered IR. 
Indeed, the suitability of the entrepreneur, which relates to a critique of their business skills, expertise, 
projections and personal qualities such as integrity (Mason and Harrison, 2001; Kollmann and 
Kuckertz, 2010; Mason and Kwok, 2010) has been shown to be extremely important in investor 
decision-making processes. Muzyka et al. (1996) suggests that investors, as well as assessing the 
entrepreneur(s), are also concerned with the management team of a potential investee organisation, 
which is often more important than analyses of the market, product and deal structure. However, 
Vasilescu (2009) also argues that it is just not the quality of a management team, but also the way that 
it is structured that is important to investors. A management team could be of a high quality and 
possess a good skill-set, but if that is not complemented by a coherent and appropriate structure then 
investors may be deterred. This has particular relevance for SEs seeking to access the SIM as research 
has shown that concerns over entrepreneurial/management skill-sets, as well as governance structures, 
are two of the main reasons for investors declining SE investment opportunities (Hill, 2011). 
 
The impact that the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur(s) has upon the chances of successfully 
acquiring investment has also been shown to be important in prior research. Bank loan officers were 
shown to make subjective evaluations around a potential investee’s character, with favourable 
characteristics viewed as conformity, low risk-taking propensity and professionalism (Wilson et al., 
2007). This has also been evidenced as taking place in the equity investment sector, with the 
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evaluation of ‘soft data’ and the use of intuition forming an integral part of the VC investor’s due-
diligence process (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Often intuitive decision-making processes are a 
symbol of a lack of clear information in a market, as investors have to rely on their ‘gut reaction’ 
(Jankowicz and Hisrich, 1987), particularly when funding start-up or early-phase businesses (Ramón et 
al., 2007; Ferrary, 2010). Indeed, this last point relating to ‘gut reaction assessments’ has also been 
shown by prior research to take place in VC assessments of social entrepreneurs (Achleitner et al., 
2012). Mason and Harrison (2001) also discuss the negative effect that poor presentational skills can 
have on a business and how this is particularly crucial in verbal, face-to-face pitches to investors. This 
importance of the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur could also be significant for SEs seeking 
investment from the SIM as the passion and drive of a social entrepreneur has been shown to be crucial 
in successfully seeking investment (Howard, 2012). 
 
The final areas relating to what constitutes IR for SMEs seeking investment has been in the ‘market’ 
characteristics of the business proposal, which relates to the market that the SME operates in, as well 
as geography and sector. Research by Mason and Harrison (2001) has shown that investors are 
discouraged by businesses that operate in highly competitive markets, as this can not only lead to poor 
growth potential, but also requires a business to be extremely well-focused and to have a clear and 
innovative ‘unique selling point’ (USP). Indeed, for an SME operating in a highly competitive market 
to successfully access finance, the business plan needs to be extremely detailed and highly developed 
to avoid rejection (Mason and Harrison, 2001). Research by Champenois et al. (2006) also identified 
that VC investment criteria were often industry specific, with investors looking for organisational 
skills complementary to that sector. Finally, Deakins et al., (2008) also identified geography as having 
an impact upon the IR of an SME, with SMEs based in rural areas struggling more than urban-based 
businesses to access finance. This was perceived to be due to a reliance on localised markets, which 
could also offer a barrier to SEs as these often operate in localised economies. 
 
Nevertheless, the IR of a potential investee is not solely related to investor perceptions of their 
business, but also on the entrepreneur’s perception/knowledge of the finance market as well. This has 
been shown to occur in relation to both the accessing of debt and equity finance by SMEs. Myers 
(1984) developed the ‘pecking order’ theory, in which entrepreneurs do not attempt to access equity-
type finance as they do not wish to give up control of their business. This has also been labelled 
‘equity aversion’ and it has been suggested that this is due to ‘information asymmetry’, in which the 
entrepreneur is not aware of or is incorrectly informed about equity investments (Van Auken, 2001; 
Silver et al., 2010). In accessing debt finance Kon and Storey (2003) and Fraser (2005) discussed the 
‘discouraged borrower’ effect. This is where the entrepreneur or SME are discouraged from applying 
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for debt finance either due to negative prior experiences or a perception that they will be unsuccessful. 
Indeed, this self-selection process can lead SMEs to ‘bootstrap’ (sustain without external help) rather 
than seeking external investment (Deakins et al., 2008). Research on SEs seeking SF has also shown 
that there is nervousness amongst SEs in seeking growth capital, as many felt that in accessing such 
investment they would be placing themselves in positions of increased financial and contractual risk. 
Indeed, Howard (2012) identifies that changing SE stakeholder mind-sets away from seeking grant-
funding towards seeking repayable investment are crucial to developing IR (Howard, 2012). 
 
Summary 
 
The prior research outlined above has provided an overview of the SIM in the UK. It has shown that 
the SIM consists of three elements; supply-side social investors, demand-side investees and 
intermediary organisations (SIFIs) that link the first two elements together (Nicholls, 2010a). 
Academic research into the perception of IR amongst SIFIs is urgently required, as whilst there is a 
significant body of academic research that explores the IR of SMEs (both from a supply-side and 
demand-side point of view), there is little research that explores IR criteria in the SIM. Indeed, the 
limited non-academic research that does exist in this area suggests that charities and social enterprises 
are often unprepared for investment and struggle to make the transition to scalable, commercial 
ventures (Howard, 2012). Studies into IR can increase collaboration between entrepreneurs and 
investors and hence create more investment opportunities (Kollmann and Kuckertz, 2010). It is 
therefore imperative that studies into IR in the SIM are undertaken. The research reported in this paper 
sought to address this by exploring the perceptions of IR amongst UK SIFI fund managers. 
 
Research Aims 
 
The review of the prior research outlined above has identified that academic research into SF and the 
SIM in the UK is limited. This is particularly true in relation to understanding the criteria used by 
SIFIs in assessing SE investment applications. The aim of the research was therefore to explore what 
SIFI fund managers perceived IR to be, as well as to explore the impact that these conceptions of IR 
would have on the future of the SIM in the UK. The research reported in this paper therefore sought to 
explore these two specific research aims outlined below, which were derived from the literature 
outlined above. 
 
Research Aim 1: What constitutes SIFI conceptions of IR and how does this relate to theories 
of IR from the mainstream finance sector? 
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Research Aim 2: What implications do the IR criteria articulated by SIFIs have for the future 
development of the SIM? 
 
Methodology 
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
An analysis of secondary data was conducted (websites, policy reports and promotional materials) in 
order to identify SIFI organisations operating in the UK SIM at a national/multi-regional level. This 
phase of the research identified 22 SIFIs, of which 15 agreed to participate in the research study (see 
Table 1 below for a breakdown of the sample). The study adopted a qualitative research method, in 
which semi-structured interviews were conducted with the fund manager (or other relevant personnel) 
at the 15 SIFIs. These interviews sought to elicit information about the SIFI organisations; participant 
perspectives of the investment decision-making process; the criteria utilised when carrying out due-
diligence; and perceptions around what constituted IR. Participant perspectives on the social finance 
market and the future of social investment were also sought. The semi-structured nature of the 
interviews also allowed the participants to discuss any other issues that they felt were important. 
 
Table 1 – Organisational Type & Interview Participant Role 
Organisation CEO Fund Manager Senior Fund Employee Total 
     
Ethical Bank/Fund (Mainly 
Debt Finance) 
0 6 2 8 
     
Social Venture Capital 
Fund (Equity Type Finance) 
0 2 0 2 
     
Social Venture 
Philanthropy Fund 
0 1 1 2 
     
Brokerage/Social Enterprise 
Development Fund (SED) 
1 2 0 3 
     
Total 1 11 3 15 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
The 15 interviews ranged from 33 minutes in length to 83 minutes in length, with an average interview 
length of 56 minutes. Out of the fifteen interviews, seven were held in person at the relevant SIFI and 
eight were held over the telephone and all interview data was recorded and transcribed for analysis. 
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The method employed to analyse the participant’s individual semi-structured interviews collected in 
the research was ‘Constant Comparative Method’ (CCM) (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). CCM is an iterative procedure designed for the qualitative analysis of text and is based on 
‘Grounded Theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). CCM has been successfully applied in previous studies 
across a wide range of disciplines including social venture creation (Haugh, 2007). This method of 
analysis focuses on a process where categories emerge from the data via inductive reasoning rather 
than coding the data according to predetermined categories (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). CCM 
involves five main stages; Immersion, ‘units of analysis’ are identified; Categorisation, ‘categories’ 
emerge from the ‘units of analysis’; Phenomenological reduction, ‘themes’ emerge from the 
‘categories’ and are interpreted by the researchers; Triangulation, support for researcher interpretations 
of ‘themes’ is sought in additional data; Interpretation, overall interpretation of findings is conducted 
in relation to prior research and/or theoretical models (McLeod, 1994).  
 
Results 
 
Analysis of the interviews identified 118 discernibly different units of analysis (UoA) (e.g. ‘Financial 
Sustainability’ and ‘Fund Size’). During ‘categorisation’ these ‘units of analysis’ were grouped into 24 
‘categories’ and from these categories 6 ‘themes’ emerged through a process of ‘phenomenological 
reduction’. These six emergent ‘themes’ were subsequently interpreted as ‘The Social Investment and 
Finance Intermediaries’, ‘The Social Investment Market’, ‘Financial Investment Criteria’, ‘Non-
Financial Investment Criteria’, ‘Decision-making Process’ and ‘Developing Investment Readiness’ 
(see Figure 1 for a diagrammatic illustration of this process). These themes were interpreted as 
organisational perceptions based upon the opinions articulated by the participants at each SIFI. It is 
proposed that an examination of these themes will reveal the factors that influence investment 
decisions within the social finance market, as well as the ‘investment-ready’ characteristics sought by 
SIFIs in investees. 
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Figure 1 – Phases of CCM Analysis for the SIFI Interview Data: 
 
      Immersion        Categorisation         Phenomenological Reduction 
      UoA (118)           Categories (24)                            Themes (6) 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NB. The numbers displayed above in Figure 1 in the ‘categories’ boxes correspond to the relevant UoA contained in that 
category. The numbers in the ‘themes’ boxes correspond to the relevant category contained in that theme. 
A: The SIFIs 
 
1, 9, 12, 13, 17. 
B: The Social Finance 
Market 
 
4, 14, 18, 19. 
C: Financial 
Investment Criteria 
 
6, 7, 15. 
D: Non-Financial 
Investment Criteria 
 
2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 22. 
E: Decision-Making 
Process 
 
16, 20. 
F: Developing 
Investment Readiness 
 
8, 21, 23, 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Discernibly 
different ‘Units 
of Analysis’ 
1: The Ethical 
Investment Funds 
 
44, 1, 3, 2. 
2: Social Enterprise 
Partners 
 
20, 21, 111, 79. 
3: Social Enterprise 
Legal Structure 
28, 25, 26, 90, 24, 
71. 
4: Social Enterprise 
Misconceptions 
 
37, 38, 39. 
5: Governance 
 
12,13, 70, 15. 
6: Social Enterprise 
Finances 
 
5, 10, 22, 16, 97. 
7: Social Enterprise 
Trading Maturity 
 
6, 7. 
8: Skillsets 
 
89, 14, 82, 103, 57. 
9: SIFI Investments 
4, 49, 65, 42, 60, 43, 
59, 118, 19, 64, 77. 
10: Initial Personal 
Relations 
 
68, 46, 56, 53, 63. 
11: Social Impact 
 
9, 11, 85, 112, 104, 
99, 27, 69, 110. 
12: SIFI Averages 
 
31, 33, 35, 36, 32, 
34, 91. 
13: SI Evaluation 
 
29, 52, 73, 76, 54. 
14: The Social 
Finance Market 
 
41, 113, 83. 
15: Criteria/Clauses 
 
47, 67, 48, 115, 92, 
66, 15, 88. 
16: SIFI Business 
Support 
 
78, 18, 17. 
17: SIFI 
Accountability 
 
30,72, 84. 
18: State Intervention 
 
61, 107, 80, 114, 95, 
2. 
19: Investing in the 
SF Market 
 
45, 55, 58. 
20: Investment 
Decisions 
 
50, 87, 51. 
21: Social Finance 
Difficulties 
 
75, 102, 81, 117, 93. 
22: Investment 
Sectors 
 
74, 96, 105, 40, 8. 
23: Bridging the Gap 
 
86, 101, 109, 108. 
24: Investment 
Readiness Criteria 
116, 98, 100, 94, 
106. 
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Research Findings 
 
Theme A: The Social Investment and Finance Intermediaries (SIFIs) 
 
The participants provided overviews of their SIFI related to fund history, legal structure and income-
streams. The majority raised capital through consumer-based investor deposits (ethical banks), private-
sector investor deposits (SVC funds), endowment funds and donations (SVP organisations), as well as 
government investment. The legal structure of the funds was also varied with ethical banks operating 
as charities, PLCs, and Industrial Provident Societies; the SVC funds being run as Companies Limited 
by Guarantee (CLG) or Share (CLS); whilst the SVP/SEDs functioned as charities or CLS. 
 
“I mean structure wise we are a Company Limited by Shares. It is wholly owned…by the 
[parent company]……the [parent company] I believe is a Company Limited by Guarantee, and 
that effectively up-streams it’s profits into the [SIFI] Foundation, which is obviously a 
charity.” (P1) 
 
“The [Fund] is obviously a different investor base, so our investors include the 
government…some charitable foundations…a number of banks…and a number of high net-
worth’s.” (P4) 
 
The participants also discussed the different types of investments that they made, which could be split 
into debt, equity and quasi-equity finance. The participants also discussed the high transaction costs of 
investing in SEs, mainly due to the need to try and reduce failure rates through rigorous due-diligence. 
 
“…the £5 million or so of commitments out of the finance fund is all investment, and that's in 
the form of loans, quasi equity, [shares]…” (P2) 
 
“Well we reckon as a rough figure for every pound we get, 65 pence gets invested, you know 
we lose under 10%. It costs us about 15% to do the deal, and the rest is sort of social costs, and 
management costs.” P11) 
 
Theme B – The Social Finance Market 
 
The participants viewed the social finance market as unusual in its demands and needs due to the dual-
mission of SEs. Sustainability was seen as a key problem due to the often low-turnovers and profit 
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margins of SEs, the high transaction costs of individual deals and the small-size of SIFIs (relative to 
the commercial sector). The participants also discussed a perceived demand/supply mismatch in the 
sector, with finance deals and sizes that were often unsuitable for small SEs. The cause of this was 
seen to be misunderstanding between the supply and demand sides of the SIM. 
 
“…the money is skewed; there is lots [of finance] at big levels for low-risk proposals…so 
you’ve got a mass of high-risk, small-scale organisations looking for investment. And it doesn’t 
cross, so it’s a dysfunctional market…” (P11) 
 
“So I think another problem too would be that some people in this SIM  [SEs], they almost 
think that because they’ve got such a good sort of ethic or impact, they don’t have to do the 
numbers. You know this is great, just support me, I’m doing good……well no it’s not like that. 
It isn’t a charitable donation; this is an investment or a loan.” (P6) 
 
Some of the SIFIs also provided funding to other SIFIs in the sector. Additionally, there was also inter-
fund cooperation both in assisting with due-diligence procedures and in providing match-funding 
investments into SEs (usually slightly higher-risk SEs). 
 
“So anyway, we invested in these funds to try and do it almost better than us because then our 
money's pulled in a bigger pool of money…So we tried that approach to say, "Okay, are there 
growth social enterprises there? Can these guys support it better?" (P2)  
 
The final area that the participants discussed was the impact that government funding had produced on 
the social investment market, through initiatives such as the ‘Social Enterprise Investment Fund’ 
(SEIF) or the development and promotion of ‘Social Impact Bonds’ (SIBs). SIBs were also seen as 
being potentially high transaction-cost investments. 
 
“I think the big thing for us is that the costs of running these sort of fund-raising exercises 
[SIBs etc.]  and the management, is quite horrendous, they’ve set so many sort of 
regulations…the sort of minimum fee of getting them going is usually quite high.” (P6) 
  
Theme C: Financial Investment Criteria 
 
Unsurprisingly, the participants talked about the fundamental need for the SE seeking investment to be 
financially sustainable and to be able to service the investment provided to them at a reasonable rate of 
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return. There was a desire to see SEs utilising multiple income streams that would not make them 
vulnerable to contract cancellations. The income origin (public, private or third sector) was not deemed 
important, as long as it was secure over the medium-term. In assessing the ‘sustainability’ of a SE’s 
finances, grant-funding was not considered as a viable source of income by most of the participants, 
although match-funding was a positive aspect that would boost ‘investment-confidence’. Overall, there 
was acknowledgement that the financial investment criteria utilised in the SIM was no different than 
that used by mainstream private-sector investors. 
 
“So obviously a social start, then it’s then looking at obviously the financials…if it’s debt 
financing, can they service it, if it’s equity or equity like mezzanine finance, is it going to 
potentially give us a reasonable return…what’s the growth potential?” (P1)  
 
“I don't think it's about income, it's about having sustainability of income sources…you want to 
look at who are your competitors? Have you maintained that level of income? What's the 
market growth in that particular area?” (P9) 
 
“…a number of the ones we see are other matched-funding, yes, we like to see that.” (P3) 
 
The trading maturity of the SE investee was also seen as very important, as all but one of the funds 
were not interested in investing in start-up SEs. Indeed, whilst the profitability of the trading income 
was not crucial, SIFIs were looking for SEs with two to three years of trading history. 
 
“…we are not looking for early start-ups, we're looking for organisations that have a proven 
model, so they may have piloted it and they may be existing, they're probably cash negative at 
the moment…but not start-up...” (P9) 
 
The final area that the participants discussed in relation to financial assessments of the potential SE 
investee was in the area of business plan scrutiny. This would usually take place at the ‘second phase’ 
of an application, when the cash-flow projections of the business proposal would be tested. This was 
sometimes done by external consultancy partners but was usually completed in-house. The market and 
potential competitors were also factored into this analysis and the due-diligence process often led to 
conditions being placed on any loan offer (i.e. the appointment of a new finance director). 
 
“I mean we would take care, an awful lot of due-diligence really. I mean as you would 
probably imagine. We are looking through the business plan; we are making sure that the 
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social entrepreneur actually understands the figures so he hasn’t just delegated it through his 
account or his finance guy.” (P6) 
 
“If it’s a good business and we see that it can work but it needs a bit more financial control we 
have to put conditions on where they need to have either financial training or they need to 
bring in someone with the skills.” (P4) 
 
Theme D: Non-Financial Investment Criteria 
 
The participants also discussed a large number of non-financial criteria that they used to assess 
potential SE investees. The personal relationship between the fund employee dealing with the 
application and the social entrepreneur was seen as of paramount importance. 
 
“So you know a mutually respectful and a mutually useful relationship, so the advice or 
support you try to provide won’t just fall on deaf ears. So that sort of two-way mutual respect I 
think is useful as well as an ability to deliver…as well as decency.” (P10) 
 
Interestingly and despite the government’s creation of the CIC legal form, the legal structure of a 
potential SE investee was not viewed as important. The participants did not always even require the 
potential investees to have asset-locks in place. 
 
“…we wouldn't exclude anybody for a particular legal status but sometimes a legal status 
determines what the investment will be. So if it's a charity, obviously we can't take 
shares……So I think it's about, you know, control of mission, control of purpose that we're 
interested in.” (P2) 
 
However, governance was seen as crucial in a SE securing investment. The participants talked about 
the need for SE investees to have an effective board that is structured properly and operates as a 
commercial enterprise would. Within this board, there was a desire to see directors who had diverse 
and complimentary skill-sets, such as financial, marketing and legal acumen. 
 
“We do, we do place importance on people, I think that’s quite important to remember, that 
people make in organisation. The skill-set, well passion is always a good one, they’ve got to be 
passionate in what they do. But we also look at the board, that’s quite crucial for us, we start 
looking at the board and the skill set that they have. So we really would like to see someone 
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with financial background or financial-nous really, somebody with legal, you know the usual 
governance, the usual good governance model.” (P8) 
 
The other major non-financial consideration was a focus upon the social mission and the social impact 
that the SE sought to make. By far the most important criterion was the need for the investee to be 
delivering a front-line social mission. The need for the social impact to be scalable along with the 
financial aspects of the business was also important. In relation to this there was also an 
acknowledgement of the double-bottom line and the pressure that delivering and measuring social 
impact had upon financial sustainability, which made the participant funds very open to different 
methods of measuring social impact.  
 
“…when I’m assessing an application, you’ve got all the normal financials, directors. What 
business plans are all about? But I actually have to fill in a section, what the social benefits 
will be…So it 100% has to have the social angle.” (P3) 
 
“The only thing that is unique to a SE is that they're trying to balance financial and social 
objectives, and then we try to help them with, you know, figuring out how to balance that and 
also how to measure their social impact, you know, what are the best metrics to use?” (P12) 
 
Finally, the majority of funds did not favour any specific sectors (i.e. health and social care) for 
investment, although a number of funds did exclude organisations with environmental missions. 
Additionally, partnerships between SEs and other institutions (i.e. universities), whilst viewed as 
beneficial, was very much secondary to the financial sustainability and social impact. 
 
“Ultimately in the decision, no, because you know the fact that the [university name] has 
invested in a proposition and we’re looking at it, the proposition still has the ability to go belly 
up. [University name] may have made a poor decision, so the underwriting strength of the 
proposition has to stand or fall on its own two feet.” (P14) 
 
Theme E: Decision-Making Process 
 
The participants also discussed the decision-making processes and structures that were in place at their 
funds. One of the most common processes in place was the assessment of initial applications, followed 
by an assessment (financial and social) of the business plan. SEs that were deemed to be potential 
investees at this stage were then supported to develop their business plan further alongside an 
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‘investment officer’, before the full finance application was sent to the fund’s investment panel where 
the final decision was made. Interestingly many of the participants stated that the small-size of their 
funds often meant that there were limited resources (mainly staff) with which to carry out the due-
diligence of applications and assist SEs to improve their business plans. This was seen as holding back 
social investment due to the high transaction costs involved. 
 
“So and once it's gone through that stage [due-diligence], we then bring it to an internal yes/no 
meeting of our finance director, chief exec and myself and there's an administrator there, and 
then if it gets through that meeting, it goes up to our investment panel, which we just call our 
finance fund panel……And that's where we will, that's the panel that can agree on 
investments.” (P2) 
 
“Another problem would be resources you know, [SIFI name] gets hundreds of enquiries from 
people who want help, and you know a vast majority of them fall outside what we are 
reasonably able to deal with because of the amount, or time involved, or the level of 
development that it’s at, or the number of staff that we have got.” (P6) 
 
The majority of the participants provided active support to potential investees, helping them to 
improve their business plans, as well as in agreeing measures of social impact. The recruitment of 
senior management staff and the placement of non-executive board directors from the fund occurred 
(understandably) much more prevalently with equity investments. This meant that the majority of 
participant funds engaged with ‘active investment’, with only one fund acting as an inactive investor.  
 
“Yes, these are [on a] one-to-one basis [prior to and post-investment], absolutely one-to-one 
basis. It’s a very, very, expensive model that is absolutely crucial in the sector…” (P8) 
 
“When we think that that’s really business critical, yes [will offer support in developing the 
management team]…And quite often our legal [team] will say that they need our permission to 
recruit anyone…so to make sure that anyone coming into a top management level position is 
someone that we are happy with.” (P5) 
 
Theme F: Developing Investment Readiness 
 
The participants articulated a number of characteristics that they would view as making a SE more IR, 
over and above the traditional aspects that have been articulated in the themes above. First, 
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organisational tenacity and resilience were seen as crucial, along with adaptability to changing market 
conditions and income streams. Second, a social entrepreneur with an articulate vision and a plan of 
how to implement this (and the experience of doing so) were seen as very important traits. Finally, the 
participants also talked about the need for the social entrepreneur and board members to genuinely 
want to undergo the organisational change towards becoming more ‘investment ready’. 
 
“I mean, we got one borrower who really got into trouble that fought desperately…I think the 
last 5 years of trying to get this thing off the ground and build it up…they're not going to lose 
what they thought was their future.” (P13) 
 
“So investment-readiness is about making an organisation resilient……an organisation should 
take those initiatives themselves, because it’s a learning element for them to develop. If you do 
it for them, it is just pointless.” (P8) 
 
In addition to the organisational structures outlined above, the participants also discussed the social 
entrepreneur/senior-management skillsets that they felt were important. The participants discussed the 
need for the social entrepreneur to have ambition, but that this should also be matched by a detailed 
understanding of the business plan and a propensity towards teamwork. The participants also stated a 
desire for practical skills and experience over accredited formal qualifications. Finally, the participants 
felt that there was a current lack of business and financial skills amongst many social entrepreneurs 
that needed to be addressed in the future. 
 
“Well, we look for entrepreneurs who have vision and ambition and so they've got to be, 
they've got to have a really clear vision for what they're trying to achieve and they've got to be 
very articulate in getting that point across……they've got to know the sector that they're 
working in, they've got to have, you know, understand the market.” (P9) 
 
“So in terms of accreditation, I’m kind of totally agnostic, I don’t mind what someone’s formal 
background is, but very much mind if that then translates into an organisation that has a really 
robust credible business plan.” (P5) 
 
“We'd look for somebody who's got the, an ability to build a team……have they the ability to 
form a team around them to do it?” (P2) 
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The final area that the participants discussed related to the difficulties that they experienced in working 
with SEs and the need to bridge the perception/understanding gap between the social investment and 
social enterprise sectors. One of the main problems identified with working with SEs was their risk-
averse nature and the intensive support that was required to get a SE to the investment stage. There 
was also an acknowledgement that many investors did not understand the social enterprise sector and 
that this made it difficult to sometimes leverage-in external investment and also led to the promotion of 
unsuitable investment vehicles in the SIM.  
 
“I think the main barrier is that a lot of voluntary social enterprises organisations don’t want 
loans they want grants they’re always saying that they need finance but by finance they mean a 
very long equity that they don’t have to worry about...” (P4) 
 
“I think there’s now too many investment bankers who’ve gone from [established financial 
firms],  just move into the sector and trying to bring new financial vehicles as they call it, into 
the sector…..I don’t believe that there’s a market for these yet.” (P8) 
 
“Growing an intermediary sector. Because unless A can find B, the investment doesn't take 
place…you know, a health related social enterprise, it doesn't know about how to secure 
investment. So if there isn't investment in the intermediary infrastructure, [the SIM] won't 
happen.” (P12) 
 
Discussion 
 
Research Aim 1: What constitutes SIFI conceptions of IR and how does this relate to theories of IR 
from the mainstream finance sector? 
 
The analysis of the data outlined above provides evidence of the normative absorption of the SIM by 
the mainstream investment markets with the needs of the investor taking primacy over those of the 
investee, driven by a ‘means-end rationality’ (Nicholls, 2010a). In relation to the financial elements of 
IR the most important financial aspect of being IR related to the sustainability of a SE’s financial 
income and their subsequent ability to service the investment at a reasonable rate of return (Mason and 
Harrison, 1999; Mason and Stark, 2004; McWade, 2012). The SIFIs preferred to see multiple income 
streams that would not leave a SE vulnerable to contract/order cancellations, although perhaps 
surprisingly the SIFIs were not concerned as to whether this income originated in the private or public 
sectors. Grant-funding was not considered by SIFIs in their financial calculations, although match-
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funding from institutional partners or other investors was viewed positively. The SIFI organisations 
were not interested in funding start-up or very early-stage SEs, instead preferring organisations with at 
least two years of trading history. This may be related to the information asymmetry within the SIM 
(Evenett and Richter, 2011), which leads investors to seek investment opportunities where there is 
more information with which to make a decision. This suggests that the SIFIs within the SIM are ‘risk-
averse’ and seek investment opportunities only where there is detailed information (Deakins et al., 
2008). The final financial aspect of IR that was articulated by the participating SIFIs related to scrutiny 
of the business plan, which offers support to prior research that highlighted the importance of a 
business plan to securing investment (McWade, 2012). It also provides evidence for the normative 
institutionalisation of the SIM with mainstream investment criteria, in which the quality of information 
held in the business plan, the evidence of the capitalisation of the business and the analysis of risk over 
return are all covered in detail (Mason and Harrison, 1999; Paul et al., 2003; Mason and Kwok, 2010). 
 
The importance of non-financial criteria to a SE’s IR was also evidenced through the data gathered 
from the SIFI interviews. As with mainstream investment, governance issues were crucial in the 
assessment of the IR of a SE. The main area of governance that the SIFIs discussed related to the skills 
and structure of the management team. The SIFIs sought investees with boards and management teams 
that contained individuals with track records in the market/sector and diverse and complimentary skill-
sets. This offers support to prior research that highlighted the importance of competent management 
teams to social investors (McWade, 2012) and also highlights the normative nature of IR in the SIM 
(Muzyka et al., 1996; Vasilescu; 2009). Interestingly, the SIFI participants did not view the legal 
structure of a SE as being important in the investment decision-making process or in relation to IR. 
Indeed, asset-locks were not even required by the majority of the SIFIs and this suggests that 
government legislation, such as the creation of the CIC legal form (Nicholls, 2010b), have been 
unimportant in shaping the SIM in the UK.  
 
The importance of the personal relationship between the SIFI and the investee was also articulated by 
the participants. This was shaped by the perceived personal characteristics of the social entrepreneur, 
with an ability to take on-board advice, integrity and decency all advocated as positives by the 
participants. This also highlights the normative nature of the SIM as such personal characteristics are 
also important in mainstream investment perceptions of IR (Mason and Harrison, 2001; Wilson et al., 
2007). This finding also offers support to prior research that suggested that information asymmetry 
was prevalent in the SIM (Evenett and Richter, 2011), as subjective ‘gut-feeling’ evaluations of 
entrepreneurs traits are symptomatic of markets that lack clear information or metrics (Jankowicz and 
Hisrich, 1987; Ramón et al., 2007; Ferrary, 2010). The final non-financial assessment of IR in the SIM 
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related to the evaluation of the SE’s social mission and impact. A frontline social mission was seen as 
key for a SE in being able to access finance from a SIFI, although this was complimentary to, rather 
than more important than, financial evaluations (McWade, 2012). Interestingly, there were no standard 
measures of social impact utilised by the SIFIs, who instead assessed a SE’s social mission through 
intuition. This is in part due to the lack of standardised metrics available for measuring social impact 
and the perceived problems of those measures that are available (i.e. SROI and GIIRS) (Maree and 
Mertens, 2012; Saltuk et al., 2011). However, it is also indicative of the ‘information asymmetry’ 
prevalent within the SIM as the lack of credible indicators of social performance, as in any market, 
forces investors to make intuitive, subjective and individual appraisals of investment opportunities 
(Jankowicz and Hisrich, 1987; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). 
 
Finally, there were other informal indicators of IR within the SIM alluded to by the SIFI participants. 
Many of these related to the social entrepreneur themselves, with participants articulating a desire to 
invest in a SE in which the lead individual had a strong vision that they could articulate clearly. 
Organisational resilience was also seen as important, with staff that could react to and cope with 
sudden market changes and funding pressures. Perhaps the most important indicator of IR in this area 
was an organisations’ willingness to seek investment finance amongst its owners, management team, 
staff and stakeholders. There was a perception amongst the SIFI participants that unless the majority of 
these elements genuinely desired to seek investment instead of grant-funding, then the development of 
IR capability would be impossible. This suggests that there is an element of ‘equity-aversion’ (Van 
Auken, 2001; Silver et al., 2010) and ‘discouraged borrower effect’ (Kon and Storey, 2003; Fraser, 
2005) on the demand-side of the SIM and this offers support to prior research that stated that social 
entrepreneurs do not wish to lose control of their SEs and/or are risk-averse (Howard, 2012). However, 
it could also be a consequence of SEs lacking information about the SIM, as well as of social investors 
and SIFIs offering investment products that are unsuitable for SEs (Evenett and Richter, 2011). 
 
Research Aim 2: What implications do the IR criteria articulated by SIFIs have for the future 
development of the SIM? 
 
The data analysis suggests that the SIM in the UK remains an asymmetrical market in relation to the 
information held by investors, intermediaries and demand-side investees (Evenett and Richter, 2011). 
The SIFI participants stated that on the supply-side of the market, some investors lacked information 
about social investments both in relation to the financial and social impact performance of SE 
investees. This is unsurprising as the small, nascent state of the market means that there is a lack of 
investments from which data and learning can be gathered. Additionally, the lack of standardised 
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metrics for social impact and the lack of trust that the SIFIs had in those that did exist (i.e. SROI) 
(Maree and Mertens, 2012), denotes a situation in which information on the scalability of social impact 
is limited. This lack of information on market performance is exacerbated by the non-standard nature 
of the demand-side of the SIM, in which investee organisations operate according to a ‘double or triple 
bottom line’ (social, environmental and economic) (Campi et al., 2006). This requires organisations in 
the SIM, such as SIFIs, to make judgements on ‘blended return’ (Emerson, 2003) with incomplete 
information on both elements of the return calculation (i.e. social/environmental and financial). This 
leads to what the participants articulated as the need to remain ‘sustainable’, which can be interpreted 
as a desire to minimise what Mason and Stark (2004) termed ‘Type 1’ errors (investing in SEs that 
fail). This offers support to prior research that identified a lack of ‘information flow’ within the SIM 
(Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls, 2010b; Wood et al., 2012), which in turn leads investors (in this case SIFIs) 
to pursue detailed due-diligence processes, which increases transaction costs (Evenett and Richter, 
2011). The high costs of individual investment deals inevitably leaves less recyclable capital and also 
leads investors such as SIFIs to ignore riskier (but perhaps more innovative) propositions (Geobey et 
al., 2012). However, some of the SIFIs were cooperating in investment propositions both in relation to 
due-diligence processes and match-funding investments. This decreases the transaction costs of 
individual deals, and promotes networks and information flow between SIFIs. Such an approach, 
where appropriate, is one that should be encouraged by policy-makers and adopted by SIFIs going 
forwards. The reduction of risk through inter-SIFI cooperation would allow for the growth of available 
capital, as well as allowing riskier investments to take place. 
 
The final area that was identified as important in assisting the UK SIM to develop, relates to demand-
side organisations understanding of the SIM; what constitutes IR within it; and the assistance that 
many SEs require in developing credible and robust business plans. Many of the SIFI participants (14 
out of the 15) operated as active investors, in which they supported SEs (often intensively) through the 
pre and post-investment stages. This support ranged from business plan development through to active 
involvement in the recruitment of senior personnel at the SE investee. Indeed, many of the SIFIs 
articulated that this support was crucial as without it the business plans and investment proposals of SE 
investees would not be of a high enough standard to secure investment. This offers support to prior 
research that articulated the need for IR programmes in developing the demand-side capabilities of an 
investment market (Mason and Harrison, 2001; Mason and Kwok, 2010). This suggests that 
government interventions to raise IR in the SE sector (i.e. the ICRF) are important in the future growth 
of the UK SIM. The data gathered in this research suggest that this IR support is currently being 
provided by SIFIs, which inevitably drives up transaction costs for investments and leads to less 
recyclable capital being available for reinvestment (Geobey et al., 2012). The development of 
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funds/organisations that independently provide IR support (independent to SIFIs), or the provision of 
funding to SIFIs specifically for the development of demand-side IR, could provide an important tool 
in growing the SIM. Indeed, such support would at least help to reduce the information asymmetry that 
currently exists between the supply and demand-sides of the SIM (Evenett and Richter, 2011). 
 
Summary 
 
The research reported in this paper has identified that amongst SIFIs the key perceived elements of IR 
in the SIM relate to financial sustainability; robust governance structures; broad and complimentary 
management team skillsets; clearly defined and scalable social missions and impacts; and a willingness 
and desire to seek investment and become IR. This aligns the concept of IR in the UK SIM with 
mainstream finance concepts of IR, with the additional need to focus upon social impact. Additionally, 
it offers empirical support to Nicholls (2010a) assertion that the SIM is undergoing a normative 
absorption by the mainstream investment markets that is driven by a ‘means-end rationality’, with the 
needs of the investor taking primacy over those of the investee. This viewpoint states that the SIM is 
being absorbed into mainstream markets through the utilisation of traditional finance tools and the 
crossover of financiers from the mainstream finance sector. This future development is also being 
hindered by the lack of robust, standard metrics of social impact and the still small-scale of the market, 
which limits the information available to SIFIs and leads to the pursuit of low-risk/large-scale 
investments. The growth of the SIM is also limited by a lack of knowledge about and desire to seek 
investment within demand-side organisations that could possibly be overcome through IR programmes 
and funds. Whilst the research reported in this paper is qualitative in nature, it is unusual in that the 
results are generalisable as the participant sample involved 15 of the identified 22 SIFIs currently 
operating in the UK. However, further research to test both the findings presented in this paper and the 
efficacy of IR programmes would provide additional evidence for the conclusions made.  
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